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Abstract
We introduce an adaptive targeted treatment assignment methodology for field ex-
periments. Our Tempered Thompson Algorithm balances the goals of maximizing
the precision of treatment effect estimates and maximizing the welfare of experi-
mental participants. A hierarchical Bayesian model allows us to adaptively target
treatments. We implement our methodology in Jordan, testing policies to help Syr-
ian refugees and local jobseekers to find work. The immediate employment impacts
of a small cash grant, information and psychological support are small, but target-
ing raises employment by 1 percentage-point (20%). After four months, cash has a
sizable effect on employment and earnings of Syrians.
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1 Introduction
Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) have become a widely-used method for policy eval-
uation (Duflo and Banerjee, 2017). In a conventional RCT, the designer randomly assigns
treatments to experimental subjects in order to precisely estimate the effects of all treat-
ments. In many contexts, however, the experimenter is not merely interested in learning
whether policies work. Instead, the experimenter wants to maximize the welfare of
program participants. To do so, the experimenter only needs to learn which treatment
works best. If the experimenter observes treatment outcomes over time, she can use this
information in order to adaptively optimize treatment assignment for future experimen-
tal participants. The concern for participant welfare is becoming even more salient as
the scale and scope of experiments grow, and when experiments are run with vulnera-
ble populations (Banerjee et al., 2017; Muralidharan and Niehaus, 2017; Haushofer and
Metcalf, 2020).
Our first contribution is to introduce a methodology for adaptive targeted field
experiments that balances the competing goals of precise treatment effect estimation
and maximizing the benefits to experimental participants. Our Bayesian algorithm has
two key features. First, it is adaptive, i.e., it changes treatment assignment probabilities
over time by incorporating information about the successes of treatments of existing
experimental participants. Second, it is targeted, i.e., it uses information about the suc-
cess rates of treatments in every group in order to target treatments for each individual
group.
Our second contribution is to implement our methodology in a field experiment.
As far as we know, ours is the first implementation of adaptive targeting in a field
experiment in development economics. Our field experiment tested three active labour
market policies for Syrian refugees and local workers in Jordan. We targeted treatments
at 16 different strata of refugees and local workers. We find that our treatments had
only a small impact on six-week employment outcomes of jobseekers, but did have
larger impacts on longer-run outcomes. In particular, our results suggest that liquidity
is an important barrier to labor market access for refugees. We also find that targeting
increased employment by one percentage point (or 20 percent). We next describe our
methodology, before turning to the context and details of our intervention.
Tempered Thompson Algorithm within a hierarchical Bayesian model The first key
feature of our methodology is that our treatment assignment is adaptive. The problem of
adaptively assigning treatments in order to maximize outcomes during the experiment
is known as a multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem; see Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi (2012) for
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a review. MAB problems are often computationally intractable and a large literature in
statistics has been devoted to finding tractable and effective heuristics to solve them. But
MAB heuristics pose a problem for an experimenter interested in estimating the effects
of all treatments: if the experimenter is quickly convinced that a particular treatment
is suboptimal, she should stop assigning it in the future. As a result, the experimenter
might miss out on learning about the effectiveness of good, though suboptimal, policies;
the resulting inferential problems are discussed in Hadad et al. (2019).
Our Tempered Thompson Algorithm combines the estimation objective of conven-
tional RCTs with the welfare-maximizing objective of bandit algorithms. The designer
starts with a prior over the effectiveness of k different treatments; we recommend a dif-
fuse and symmetric default prior. Every period, the designer observes the outcomes of
some of the current participants in the experiment. As a result, the designer can estimate
the posterior probability p̂dxt that treatment d is optimal for individuals from stratum x
at time t. Then, at time t, the Tempered Thompson Algorithm assigns treatments in the
following way, for individuals from stratum x:




With probability (1− γ):assign treatment d to individual i with probability p̂dxt .
The Tempered Thompson Algorithm generalizes two classical treatment assign-
ment protocols. When γ = 1, our algorithm boils down to a conventional random-
ized controlled trial. When γ = 0, our algorithm is the Thompson (1933) algorithm
used in many online contexts, including platform revenue management, movie recom-
mendations, and ad placement (Russo et al., 2018). However, when 0 < γ < 1, the
Tempered Thompson Algorithm (asymptotically) maximizes welfare of the participants




This allows the designer to target participant welfare while ensuring that she can learn
something about the effectiveness of suboptimal treatments. Our main theoretical result
(Theorem 1) formally establishes a trade-off between the welfare of participants and
the precision of the estimates: as γ increases, the expected variance of treatment effect
estimators falls, but the expected outcomes of participants also decrease. We discuss a
number of additional considerations that may guide the choice of γ in the main body of
the paper.
The second key feature of our methodology is that our adaptive assignment algo-
rithm is targeted. We use a hierarchical Bayesian approach in order to estimate heteroge-
neous treatment effects. Our model allows us to learn the extent of effect heterogeneity
across different strata. At each time period t, the treatment effect of each treatment d
in each stratum x is estimated as a weighted average of the observed success rate for d
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in x and the observed success rates for d across all other strata. The weights are deter-
mined optimally by the observed amount of heterogeneity across all strata as well as the
available sample size in a given stratum. The posterior probability p̂dxt that treatment d
is optimal for stratum x is then calculated from this posterior distribution of treatment
effects.
Implementation and Results We implement our methodology in a field experiment
designed to help Syrian refugees and local jobseekers in Jordan find wage work. Jor-
dan is a highly relevant context in which to study employment policies for refugees,
for at least two reasons. First, employment generation for refugees is a pressing policy
concern. Since the start of the Syrian conflict, Jordan received close to 700,000 Syrian
refugees — one tenth of its original population (UNHCR, 2020a). Most Syrian refugees
live in urban areas, outside camps, and 93% are below the national poverty line (Verme
et al., 2015). Second, in 2016, Jordan and the International Community launched the
Jordan Compact: in exchange for trade concessions and access to conditional financing,
the Government of Jordan agreed to provide 200,000 work permits for refugees, lifting
existing legal barriers that prevented them from obtaining work. The Jordan Compact
has influenced refugee policy around the world (Betts and Collier, 2017). Legal restric-
tions to refugee employment are common in both developed and developing countries,
and similar compacts are being launched to remove them, for example in Ethiopia. Jor-
dan thus provides an opportune context to understand how to connect refugees to the
new employment opportunities that are opening for them. To our knowledge, this is the
first field experiment that studies the employment of refugees in a developing country
context.
The experimental design and empirical analysis were specified before the start of
the experiment in a pre-analysis plan submitted to the AEA registry.1 The field experi-
ment tests three types of support: a small, unconditional cash transfer (worth about one
month of average monthly expenditure); information provision to increase the ability
to signal skills to employers; and a behavioral nudge to strengthen job search motiva-
tion. These types of support correspond to three barriers – material, informational, and
behavioral – that refugees and locals might face in finding and retaining jobs, and are of-
ten discussed in the qualitative and non-experimental literature (Schuettler and Caron,
2020). The program was implemented in Jordan by the International Rescue Committee
(IRC) at the height of the Syrian refugee crisis.
In the experiment, we set γ = 0.2 in the Tempered Thompson Algorithm to en-
sure that in every period every one of three treatments and the control has at least
1 Available at https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3870-2.2.
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0.05 probability of being assigned. We define 16 strata: {Syrian, Jordanian} × {Female,
Male} × {High school, No high school} × {Never employed, Ever employed}. Program
intake started in mid-February 2019 and ended in December 2019. Overall, we sampled
3,770 individuals, approximately evenly split between Syrians and Jordanians. We track
participants’ employment outcomes with a ‘rapid follow-up’ phone interview six weeks
after treatment; this survey asks simply about wage employment, and is used to imple-
ment our Tempered Thompson Algorithm . We then run detailed follow-up surveys two
and four months after treatment. These surveys enable to us measures a broader set of
impacts and to study effects over a longer time period.2
Our first finding is that, six weeks after being offered treatment, none of the inter-
ventions has significant or meaningful impact on the probability that individuals are in
wage employment (the first outcome that we specified in our pre-analysis plan). How-
ever, while the control-treatment difference in outcomes is close to zero, we estimate
that the average impact of the optimised treatment (i.e. of offering the best possible
intervention to each stratum) is about a 1 percentage point increase in employment (a
20 percent gain), suggesting some moderate short-term gains from targeting.
Second, we find that the cash intervention has large and significant impacts on
refugee employment and earnings, two and four months after treatment. While employ-
ment rates remain stubbornly low in the control group, the cash grant raises job search
rates and enables refugees to place more job applications. As a result, four months af-
ter treatment, the grant boosts employment by 3.8 percentage points (70 percent) and
earnings by 65 percent. These are sizable impacts compared to those documented in the
recent literature on active labor market policies (McKenzie, 2017). We also document
substantial increases in hourly wages and in the probability of retaining a job between
the two and four month interviews, indicating that match quality has also increased.
Consistent with the existence of binding liquidity constraints, we find that these im-
pacts are driven by individuals with below-median expenditure at baseline, and that
baseline expenditure is significantly associated with job search intensity in the control
group. Finally, we simulate how the Tempered Thompson Algorithm would have per-
formed if we had set two-month employment as the objective instead of six-week wage
employment. We find that the Tempered Thompson algorithm quickly directs partici-
pants towards the optimal interventions and could have doubled the employment gains
of a standard RCT. These simulations show that the Tempered Thompson Algorithm
can generate substantial gains even with the levels of treatment effects we see in this
context, but that the choice of the objective function is quite important.
2 We were unable to complete a six month follow-up interview due to the national lockdown in Jordan
during the Covid pandemic.
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Third, the information and behavioral nudge interventions also boost job search
among refugees and have significant impacts on employment and earnings after two
months. However, these impacts are smaller than those of the cash grant and are ul-
timately short lived. Four months after treatment, we find weaker and insignificant
impacts of these interventions.
Fourth, we find essentially no positive effects of treatment on the Jordanian sam-
ple.3 While Jordanians and Syrians were sampled in a similar way and have identical
baseline employment rates, Jordanians tend to be more educated and to have higher
baseline expenditure. Further, control Jordanians search at much higher intensity than
control Syrians and have better employment outcomes after baseline. This group may
thus face weaker or different job search frictions, which are not addressed by our inter-
ventions.
These results shed light on the barriers to employment opportunities faced by
refugees in a developing-country context. This evidence is particularly relevant for pol-
icy, as governments around the world consider expanding legal access to labor markets
for refugees. In particular, our results point to the key role played by liquidity con-
straints, as in classical models of poverty traps (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Balboni
et al., 2020). Our comprehensive findings on these constraints – including the large
employment impacts of a small unconditional cash grants, a strong control association
between liquidity and job search intensity, and the large heterogeneity of treatment
effects with respect to liquidity – represent some of cleanest evidence in the recent ex-
perimental literature on the impacts of limited liquidity in urban labor markets.4 At the
same time, the job-search impacts of the other two interventions, which do not provide
additional liquidity, show that cash is not a binding constraint for all refugees in our
sample. Both information and motivation seem to further limit participation in labor
markets.
3 We find a large and significant impact of job search from the psychological intervention, but no impacts
on employment or earnings. Further, the cash and information interventions do not have significant
impacts on any of our pre-specified outcomes.
4 There is consistent evidence that interventions that provide much larger cash grants, worth up to one year
of income, do not discourage work (Banerjee et al., 2017). These interventions typically aim at fostering
entrepreneurship, are often evaluated in rural contexts, and do not measure impacts on job search. Our
findings are unique in that they study the effect of a much smaller grant and identify impacts on job
search in an urban labor market. The only comparable study is Banerjee and Sequeira (2020), who find
a small unconditional cash grant boosts job search, but not employment, among young South Africans.
Further, other studies such as Franklin (2018), Abebe et al. (2020) and Abebe et al. (2020) analyse the
impacts of conditional transfers or financial application incentives that simultaneously relax individuals’
budget constraint and decrease the ‘price’ of job search relative to other types of consumption. Thus,
they do not offer conclusive evidence on the existence of binding liquidity constraints.
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Related literature Our paper spans two distinct literatures. Methodologically, our
work is related to experimentation, MAB problems, and targeted treatment assignment.
While there is a large theoretical literature on optimal experimentation in MAB problems
(e.g., Gittins (1979)), the bedrock of our analysis is the ‘probability matching’ algorithm
due to Thompson (1933). Recently, a number of papers have shown for various settings
that the Thompson algorithm is asymptotically efficient, among all possible adaptive
algorithms, in terms of participant welfare (Agrawal and Goyal, 2012; Kaufmann et al.,
2012; Agrawal and Goyal, 2013; Wager and Xu, 2021). We contribute to a growing num-
ber of papers in economics using adaptive experimental methods (Kasy and Sautmann,
2020; Kasy and Teytelboym, 2020a,b). There is also a recent literature within economics
on targeted treatment assignment both from non-Bayesian (e.g., Kasy (2015); Kitagawa
and Tetenov (2018); Wager and Athey (2018); Chernozhukov et al. (2018)) and Bayesian
perspectives (e.g., Dehejia (2005); Chamberlain (2011)).
We also contribute to the literature on active labour market policies in developing
and emerging economies. Specifically, ours is the first field experiment on employment
of refugees in a development context.5 The literature on active labour market policies
has generally found that such policies have limited effectiveness (McKenzie, 2017). This
includes three novel experiments among educated youth in Jordan: one involving wage
subsidy vouchers (Groh et al., 2016a), one involving training in soft skills (Groh et al.,
2015, 2016b), and one involving direct matching of job-seekers to firms (Groh et al.,
2015). However, in other contexts, recent experiments have identified several effective
policy interventions: conditional cash transfers and financial application incentives have
been found to increase short-term employment or applicant quality through increas-
ing job search (Franklin, 2018; Abebe et al., 2020; Banerjee and Sequeira, 2020; Abebe
et al., 2020), skill-signalling workshops can increase wages through improved assorta-
tive matching (Alfonsi et al., 2020; Bassi and Nansamba, 2020; Abebe et al., 2020), and
detailed job-search plans have increased employment through more effective job search
(Abel et al., 2019). We draw on each of these three recent areas of innovation to design
our three treatments. The previous literature tends to focus on young nationals with
poor attachment to the labour market (see, for example, Kluve et al. (2019)). Our work
is novel in taking insights from those earlier experiments to a population of refugees, for
whom constraints may be quite different (Loiacono and Vargas, 2019). In this way, our
paper also relates to recent attempts to generalize experimental results across different
contexts (see, for example, Meager (2019)).
5 Battisti et al. (2019) evaluate a job-matching intervention for recently-arrived refugees in Germany.
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Roadmap The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the humanitarian and
the labour market context in Jordan, our sampling procedure, and the three treatments.
Section 3 explains our adaptive treatment assignment algorithm and derives its theoret-
ical properties. Section 4 presents our empirical findings, including qualitative evidence
from focus group interviews. Section 5 concludes. Appendix A.1 gives the proof of
the main theorem. Appendix A.2 provides details on the Markov Chain Monte Carlo
algorithm for the hierarchical Bayesian model, and Appendix A.3 has some additional
tables and figures. The Online Appendix contains treatment materials used in the field
as well as additional tables and figures.
2 Context, sampling and treatments
The world is facing the largest refugee crisis since World War II, with over 80 million
individuals displaced, about 26 million of whom are refugees (UNHCR, 2020b). Amidst
this crisis, the duration of displacement has increased – with refugees now displaced for
10 years on average (Devictor and Do, 2017). The unprecedented magnitude and chang-
ing nature of displacement has catalyzed a big shift in thinking about how assistance is
provided for refugees and internally displaced people.
Over the past decade, the international community has moved away from a model
in which refugees are housed in camps – receiving aid in perpetuity – to a model focused
on identifying sustainable solutions that integrate refugees and internally-displaced
people into local communities and labor markets. In many contexts, this has fueled
a change from delivering basic commodities and food items to supporting individuals
to gain access to employment. This change in approach is not isolated to any specific
location, but is increasingly becoming the dominant model for delivering humanitarian
assistance.
A crucial part of integrating displaced individuals into labor markets is providing
the support necessary to generate employment opportunities at scale for communities
affected by crises. However, there is a dearth of evidence on what works for these groups
and in these contexts. In part, this is due to the challenging nature of experimenting
in crisis-affected contexts – where security issues and the need to deliver timely ser-
vices make experimentation difficult. More generally, refugees and internally-displaced
people face a unique set of constraints in accessing employment opportunities. They
often lack the information, language skills and social networks needed to navigate labor
markets effectively. Many have lost assets and have limited savings; this can constrain
individuals from accessing the type of childcare, transit or basic needs required to get
a job. Trauma, uncertainty and social exclusion may also reduce refugees’ intrinsic
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motivation to search for an employment opportunity. These micro-level barriers may
be compounded at the national level by governments who impose legal restrictions on
whether or what types of jobs can be accessed.
2.1 The Syrian refugee crisis
Since 2012, the Syrian crisis has displaced more than 13.1 million people, making it the
largest refugee crisis of our time (UNHCR, 2020a). Approximately seven million are dis-
placed internally within Syria; about another six million fled to neighbouring countries.
The Government of Jordan estimates that, since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, nearly
1.3 million refugees have arrived in the country; of these, about 660,000 have registered
with UNHCR (UNHCR, 2020a). Eight years into the conflict, Syrian refugees in Jordan
face important needs for humanitarian assistance, for basic services, and for economic
stability. In 2015, it was estimated that 93% of Syrian refugees in the country lived be-
low the US$5 per day poverty line (Verme et al., 2015). At the same time, low-skilled
Jordanians continue to suffer from pre-existing labor market challenges, including high
unemployment, which leaves them also economically vulnerable (IRC, 2017; Govern-
ment of Jordan, 2019; UNHCR, 2020a).
In an attempt to address some of the issues associated with the protracted displace-
ment, the Government of Jordan and the international community met at the London
Conference in 2016 and explored new ways to support countries most affected by the
Syrian crisis. For Jordan, a key outcome of the event was the signing of the Jordan
Compact – hailed at the time as an innovative approach for host countries and the in-
ternational community to respond to protracted displacement. Under the Compact,
European and international donors pledged a total of US$2.1 billion in direct grants and
US$1.9 billion in concessional loans to the Government of Jordan (Barbelet et al., 2018).
The Compact also granted Jordan trade concessions that relaxed ‘rules of origin’ criteria
and opened export markets in Europe. In exchange, the Government of Jordan com-
mitted to important policy changes aimed at improving access of Syrian refugees to the
labor market. In particular, the government agreed to ease administrative procedures
to allow Syrian refugees to apply for work permits in manufacturing, agriculture, and
construction – with a goal of providing work permits for up to 200,000 Syrian refugees
(IRC, 2017).6
6 In addition, the Government of Jordan also agreed to: (i) designate and develop five industrial zones,
later called the Special Economic Zones (SEZs); (ii) allow Syrian refugees to formalize existing businesses
and to set up new businesses; (iii) provide a small number of employment opportunities for Syrians in
municipal works.
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2.2 The Jordanian labor market
The labour market in Jordan is characterised by very low employment rates, by inter-
national standards. For example, the Employment and Unemployment Survey (EUS)
reports, for the last quarter of 2016, an employment rate of 30 percent and overall labor
force participation rate of 36 percent.7 This very low average masks significant hetero-
geneity by gender. Among males, labor force participation is close to 59 percent, while
among females it only equals 13.5 percent. Fallah et al. (2019) compile EUS figures
for a longer period of time, showing that some of these are persistent features of the
Jordanian labor market.
Employment rates among refugees are much lower than among Jordanians. In
early 2017, the Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey (JLMPS) was adapted to include
an almost-representative sample of Syrian refugees in Jordan.8 According to the JLMPS
figures, the employment rate among Syrian refugees stood at 14 percent. Among women
refugees, the employment rate was only 2 percent. This employment was often informal
and median monthly salaries were below the national minimum wage.9
Employment among Syrian refugees is likely to be constrained by both demand
and supply side factors. On the labour demand side, firms often report difficulties in
processing work permits for Syrians but also fear the consequences of sanctions applied
to informal work. Further, refugees face strong competition from both Jordanian na-
tionals and other migrants. This is partly because firms are required to meet a quota
of employing at least 15% Jordanians. Moreover, migrant workers (mostly from South
Asia) were already employed in large numbers in many of the low-paying jobs that were
opened to Syrians as part of the Jordan Compact (Amjad et al., 2017).
On the labor supply side, several search frictions are likely to be present. First,
refugees are often credit-constrained due to lost assets, networks, and sources of income
(Government of Jordan, 2019). Second, they have little experience in and information
on the formal labor market in the host economy, which could drive decisions to work
informally or not work at all. Third, they may experience self-control problems when
it comes to searching for work, possibly resulting from the traumas of displacement
and/or a number of restrictive labor market policies (Shami, 2019). Lastly, job quality
7 The labor force participation rates gives the ratio of economically active individuals (employed or looking
for work) over total working-age individuals in the country.
8 OAMDI, 2018. Labor Market Panel Surveys (LMPS), http://erf.org.eg/data-portal/. Version
1.1 of Licensed Data Files; JLMPS 2016. Egypt: Economic Research Forum (ERF).
9 75 percent of employed refugees reported that they did not have a formal work contract. This is most
likely an underestimate of the rate of informality, as many refugees may be reluctant to report informal
work. In the same questionnaire, 99 percent of refugees reported that their employer was not making
social security contributions – a key indicator of formality. In terms of salaries, the median monthly
salary was 187 Jordanian Dinars, while the formal minimum wage was 200 Jordanian Dinars.
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in the formal sector is often a barrier to labour supply. Recent evidence shows that both
Syrians and Jordanians perceive that formal work, particularly in the manufacturing
sector, is often exhausting, exploitative, and potentially risky (Amjad et al., 2017; Razzaz,
2017). Importantly, these barriers are by no means unique to refugees in Jordan, as is
consistently highlighted by the non-experimental literature on displacement (Loiacono
and Vargas, 2019; Schuettler and Caron, 2020).
2.3 Sampling Syrian and Jordanian job-seekers
Our partner IRC enrolled individuals for a program called ‘Project Match’ on a rolling
basis over a six-month period between February 10, 2019 and November 30, 2019. The
program was active in three cities: the capital Amman, and the northern cities of Irbid,
and Mafraq. To be eligible for this study, participants had to be: (i) Syrian refugees or
Jordanian nationals with valid government identification, (ii) between 18 and 45 years
old (inclusive), and (iii) willing to take up low-skilled formal wage work that pays ap-
proximately minimum wage in the immediate future. We verified that the participants
met these requirements and further collected information for the research during the in-
take registration interviews. At the end of the interview, participants were randomized
into a treatment group based on the algorithm described in section 3.
Participants were selected using a variety of passive and active recruitment meth-
ods. The passive methods entailed IRC employment service officers (ESOs) contacting
potential program participants. We refer to this as ‘passive’ selection as it was initiated
by the ESO and not by the program participant. In the majority of cases, employment
officers learned about potential program participants from referrals given by commu-
nity leaders, other programs or partner organizations, and other study participants.
Additionally, the ESOs conducted door-to-door home visits to neighborhoods that were
known to host a high number of refugees. These neighborhoods were identified using
UNHCR maps and the experience of ESOs hired to work with Project Match. Further,
individuals who had not been contacted by an ESO were also eligible to apply for the
program. We refer to this as ‘active’ selection as it was initiated by the program par-
ticipant. Individuals could enrol by visiting specific community-based organizations
(CBOs), visiting the IRC offices, responding to ads posted on social media, or by attend-
ing an information session on Project Match at the UNHCR offices.
There were no major differences in the ways that Syrians and Jordanians were
sampled. For both Syrians and Jordanians, the largest share of enrolments came from
referrals, a passive sampling method. The second largest source of participants for both
nationalities was enrolment by the job-seeker at a CBO (an active sampling method).
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Slightly more Syrians than Jordanians were sampled through home visits conducted by
the ESOs. However, overall, low-skilled and more economically vulnerable Jordanians
often resided in areas similar to those of refugees and also engaged actively with CBOs
to access various forms of welfare. We summarise the frequency of these different
sampling methods by nationality in Table A.2 in the Online Appendix. The proportion
of participants enrolled through passive versus active methods changed over time, but
not dramatically. In particular, in the months of May to July, 2019, more participants
enrolled in Project Match through active methods. In subsequent months, this was
largely reversed. We illustrate these patterns in Figure A.4 of the Online Appendix.
2.4 Key features of the sample
In total, we sampled 1,663 Syrians and 2,107 Jordanians. We report a number of descrip-
tive statistics in Table 1. On several dimensions, the Syrian and Jordanian samples have
similar characteristics. For both nationalities, 60 percent of the sample is composed by
women, average age is about 29 years, and the average household is composed of about
5 individuals. Also, 2 percent of individuals of both nationalities are in wage employ-
ment and the average person has 5 years of work experience. Syrians however tend to
be less educated on average (7 years vs 12 years). Our sample, while not intended to be
representative as such, is nonetheless broadly similar to the near-representative JLMPS
data in terms of respondents’ age and education.
Many individuals in our sample live below the poverty line. Average household
expenditure among Syrians is about 360 Jordanian Dinars (JOD) per month. This is
approximately 72 JOD per person per month, or 2.4 JOD per day, which is well below
the national poverty line of 3.5 JOD.10 Daily expenditure among Jordanians is about 3
JOD – 25 percent higher, but still below the poverty line.
About half of the sample (40 percent of refugees and 50 percent of Jordanians) are
actively looking for work at the time of the baseline interview. On average, refugees
have placed about 1.4 job applications in the previous month and have spent 3 hours
looking for work in the previous seven days. Among those refugees that were actively
searching for work, total job search expenditure in the last seven days amounted to 6.9
JOD. Among Jordanians, average expenditure was 8.7 JOD.
We divide this sample in sixteen strata based on four dummy variables: (i) nation-
ality (a dummy for whether the respondent is Jordanian, defined as having a Jordanian
national ID); gender (a dummy for identifying as female), (iii) education (a dummy for
10 This is a lower bound to daily per-capita expenditure, as in the calculation we assume that all members
of the household are adult.
12
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Sample All Syrian Jordanian
(1) (2) (3)
Female 0.60 0.60 0.60
Age 28.82 29.66 28.15
Household head 0.27 0.38 0.19
Household size 4.88 4.98 4.80
Educaton (years) 10.24 7.71 12.24
Spent at least 5 years in Jordan - 0.95 -
Wage employed 0.02 0.02 0.02
Work experience (years) 4.48 4.99 4.10
Monthly HH Expenditure (JOD) 395.83 358.05 425.65
Searched for work 0.46 0.38 0.52
Applications (no.) 1.91 1.41 2.31
Hours search 3.14 2.60 3.58
Money spent (if searching) 8.03 6.90 8.69
Sample size 3770 1663 2107
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics for the Syrian and Jordanian samples at baseline. ‘Monthly
HH Expenditure’ is total household expenditure in the last 30 days. This variable is obtained by summing
reported expenditure in 9 different categories (including food, housing, utilities, water, transport, health,
education, communication, and other). Missing values on specific expenditure items are replaced with the
sample average. ‘Searched for work’ is a dummy for whether the person has done any job search in the
last 30 days. ‘Applications’ is the number of job applications completed in the last 30 days. ‘Hours search’
is the number of hours of job search in the last seven days. ‘Applications’ and ‘Hours search’ take a value
of zero if the respondent is not searching for work. ‘Money spent’ is the amount of money spent on job
search in the last seven days, if the respondent is searching for work. ‘Applications’, ‘Hours search’ and
‘Money spent’ are windsorised at the 99th percentile of the nationality-specific distribution.
having completed high school or more), and (iv) work experience (a dummy for having
experience in wage employment). These strata form the basis of our targeting strategy,
discussed in the next section. In Figure A.5 of the Online Appendix, we show the distri-
bution of observations across strata. While for most cells we have good sample sizes, we
only have a small proportion of people, especially Syrians, who have education beyond
high school.
Note that we will not report statistics regarding the balance of covariates across
treatments. The reason, as discussed further below, is that our treatment assignment
algorithm targets assignment based on these covariates. We therefore do not expect that
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covariates are balanced across treatment arms. The estimates discussed in Section 4
below correct for imbalance across strata by reweighting.
2.5 Treatments
On the basis of these key features, and working closely with local experts at the IRC in
Amman, we designed three separate job search interventions.11 Each intervention was
designed to represent a distinct form of job search assistance, each having support in
the recent empirical literature.12 These interventions will be denoted by D ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
where 0 refers to respondents assigned to the control group; the three search interven-
tions respectively provide cash, information, and psychological support. All interven-
tions were delivered at the end of the intake interview or in the following seven days.
In addition to these treatments, all respondents received 4 JOD (about US$5.60 USD at
the time of the intervention), and an informational flyer with a very brief discussion of
job interviews.
Control group. The control group received the 4 JOD and the basic informational flyer
that were offered to everyone upon registration with Project Match.
Treatment 1: A labeled cash transfer. The cash support is a labeled cash transfer
(LCT) of a value of 65 JOD (about US$92 at the time of the intervention). This transfer
was intended to support the recipient to pay for the cost of job search – including
transport, grooming, time costs and, for at least some study participants, childcare. It
was designed based on evidence that small transfers cause large responses in job-search
intensity (Herkenhoff et al., 2016; Franklin, 2018; Abebe et al., 2020). As shown in Table
1, the transfer enabled refugees to cover the average cost of job search for a period of
about 10 weeks. The transfer was ‘labeled’ in that, at the time of distribution, study
participants were offered recommendations on how they should use this cash, i.e., to
help with the job search in the above-mentioned ways); however, respondents were also
informed that they were free to spend the cash as they thought it was most appropriate
(Benhassine et al., 2015). Upon delivery of the intervention, participants received an
empty ATM card, which was charged (within an average of seven working days) with a
one-time cash payment of 65 JOD. Upon charging of the ATM card, recipients received
an SMS notification. They also received an ATM guide pamphlet with a direct hotline
11 We prototyped and modified the interventions with about 130 respondents before commencing the ran-
domized field experiment.
12 Some respondents were also assigned to one of two separate ‘direct placement’ arms; this is the focus of
a separate paper.
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number for reporting issues with cash withdrawal from ATMs. To put this intervention
in context, it is important to note that this transfer is substantially smaller than the
grants studied in the unconditional cash transfer literature. For example, Haushofer
and Shapiro (2016) evaluate the impact of a transfer worth about two years of average
consumption. In contrast, our transfer amounts to less than one month of average
personal refugee expenditure.
Treatment 2: Information. The second intervention provided informational support.
Prior evidence suggested that both Syrian refugees and low-skilled Jordanians had little
understanding of either the interview process or the legal obligations owed by em-
ployers to their workers (Gordon, 2017). For example, a common myth among Syrian
refugees in Jordan is that, by working in a formal job and holding a work permit, the
Syrian would lose her or his UNHCR financial assistance package.13 Specifically, re-
spondents in this treatment received in-depth information on (i) how to prepare for and
interview for a formal job in Jordan (following, in particular, the recent results from
Abebe et al. (2020)), and (ii) the legal rights of employees in formal jobs. Information
was delivered through face-to-face interaction with a trained Project Match employment
service officer, two videos describing the formal jobs and associated labor laws from the
eyes of a job-seeker, and two take-home paper tools. The paper tools were designed
for low-literacy participants and include cartoons for easy comprehension (see Online
Appendix Figures A.1 and A.2). One of the tools was designed as an interactive myth-
busting activity whereby participants are exposed to common myths about formal jobs
and worker rights, and then upon scratching the surface of the box below the myth, can
see the reality.
Treatment 3: Nudge. The third intervention is psychological support; we refer to this
as the ‘nudge’ intervention. We provide a packaged intervention composed of (i) a
four-week job-search planning calendar as in Abel et al. (2019) (see Online Appendix
Figure A.3), (ii) an instructional video on how to use the calendar to plan for job search,
(iii) a face-to-face demonstration delivered by the ESOs, and finally (iv) reminder SMSs.
The instructional video begins with a statement on the potential impacts of job-search
planning: ‘Did you know that job-search planning can increase chances of finding work
by up to 25%?’ Additionally, if the participants send a text message to IRC with their job-
search goals, they receive two reminder SMS, at the beginning of the week and at the end
of the week. Through the calendar and the SMSs, participants track the number of jobs
13 The legal reality is that UNHCR financial assistance is not linked to having a work permit; instead, it
depends upon a thorough financial needs assessment.
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they intend to apply for and hours of job search they intend to spend, and can then check
whether they met their goals for the week. This goal-setting and goal-reviewing exercise
is designed to address self-control problems, which have been highlighted as a key
constraint in recent research on job search (DellaVigna and Paserman, 2005; Caliendo
et al., 2015; Abel et al., 2019).
2.6 Follow-up surveys and attrition
We measure the impacts of these interventions through three follow-up surveys, all
administered by phone. First, we complete a very short follow-up survey six weeks
after baseline. This survey is focused exclusively on measuring whether the respondent
is currently in wage employment. The purpose of this survey was to provide the key
outcome variable to implement the adaptive treatment assignment that we describe in
the following section. For logistical reasons, this survey was conducted by a single
enumerator, who had not previously interacted with respondents. We refer to this as
the ‘rapid follow-up survey’.
We then complete in-depth phone surveys two and four months after the base-
line interview. (We had initially planned a six-month follow-up survey, but this was
cancelled due to the Covid-19 pandemic and the strict lockdown measures imposed in
Jordan.) We use these surveys to document the impacts of the program on a battery
of outcomes specified in our pre-analysis plan. These interviews are carried out by the
team of ESOs, with each respondent contacted by the same person who had interviewed
the respondent at baseline and had enrolled them in the program. We refer to these two
surveys as the ‘ESO follow-up surveys’.
Our attrition is low throughout. In the rapid follow-up survey, attrition was 1.2
percent. In the ESO follow-up survey, we suffered attrition of approximately 2% at
the two-month mark and 4.5% at the four-month mark (Online Appendix Table A.3).
For Syrians, attrition in the nudge intervention is 1 percentage point above control at
the two-month follow-up and 3 percentage points higher at the four-month point (On-
line Appendix Table A.4). For Jordanians, attrition in the information intervention is 1
percentage point above control at the two-month follow-up and 1.5 percentage points
higher at the four-month point (Online Appendix Table A.5). Attrition for the cash in-
tervention is very close to that of the control group (and not significantly different), in
both follow-up surveys and both for Syrians and for Jordanians.14
14 We report p-values in Online Appendix Tables A.3, A.4 and A.5 by using randomisation inference, as
described in Section 3.5. Some of the differences in attrition rates are marginally significant. Given the
small rate of attrition overall, however, we consider it unlikely that our effect estimates discussed in
Section 4 below are affected by differential attrition.
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3 Treatment assignment and inference
In this section we describe our treatment assignment algorithm. Our algorithm is a mod-
ification of Thompson sampling (Thompson, 1933; Russo et al., 2018). This modification
is motivated by the fact that our experiment has two objectives. Our primary objective
is to get as many experimental participants into formal employment as possible. Our
secondary objective is to test the effectiveness of alternative interventions.
We implement our algorithm using a hierarchical Bayesian model; cf. Gelman et al.
(2014). The data-generating process for the binary potential outcomes corresponding to
each treatment d and stratum x is governed by a parameter θdx, which determines the
success rate for this treatment and stratum. For a given treatment d, the parameters θdx
are drawn from a prior distribution Beta(αd, βd). The hyper-parameter (αd, βd) deter-
mine the average success rate and dispersion of treatment effects across strata, for this
treatment d. These hyper-parameters are assumed to in turn be drawn from a diffuse
hyper-prior distribution π. The posterior distribution can be interpreted as follows. In
every period, the experimenter observes treatment success rates for existing experimen-
tal participants for all strata and treatments. This allows her to learn the mean and
dispersion of treatment effects across strata. She can then combine the estimate of these
hyper-parameters with the observed success rate in a given stratum in order to calculate
the posterior distribution of the success parameter θdx in that stratum. Finally, these
posterior distributions can be used to calculate the probabilities p̂dxt that a given treat-
ment is optimal for a given stratum. These probabilities are then used in the Tempered
Thompson Algorithm.
After describing this Bayesian setup, we review Thompson sampling. Thompson
sampling is based on the posterior probability that each of the treatments is optimal,
conditional on observed covariates. We then introduce our modification, the Tempered
Thompson Algorithm, which provides a compromise between Thompson sampling and
full (balanced) randomization. In Theorem 1 we characterize how the Tempered Thomp-
son Algorithm trades off our two objectives, helping participants and obtaining precise
estimates. The source code for our assignment algorithm is available in a public reposi-
tory.15
This section concludes with a discussion of inference. Our first method of inference
is Bayesian. Our second method of inference uses p-values based on randomization
inference. Randomization inference needs to take into account the adaptive and targeted
form of treatment assignment in order to be valid.
15 At https://github.com/maxkasy/ThompsonHierarchicalApp. A corresponding interactive app
is available at https://maxkasy.github.io/home/hierarchicalthompson/.
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We use the following notation. Let t denote the day the participant enrolled in
the program and was offered the intervention and let i index individuals within days.
Note that we have repeated cross-sections, not a panel, so that individual i on day
t is different from individual i on day t′ when t 6= t′. Let x index strata and d index
treatments. Finally, mdxt denotes the total number of times that treatment d was assigned
to individuals in stratum x up to time t, and rdxt denotes the corresponding total number
of successes, that is, individuals for whom Yit = 1.
3.1 Hierarchical Bayesian model
We consider a hierarchical Bayesian model with a data generating process, described by
Eq. (1), and a prior, described by Eqs. (2) and (3) below. Let θdx be the average potential
outcome for treatment d in stratum x. We assume that
Ydit|(Xit = x, θdx, αd, βd) ∼ Ber(θdx), (1)
θdx|(αd, βd) ∼ Beta(αd, βd), (2)
(αd, βd) ∼ π, (3)
where (αd, βd) are the hyper-parameters and π is the hyper-prior (cf. Gelman et al. (2014,
chapter 5)). Eq. (2) says that for a given treatment d, average potential outcomes θdx
for all strata come from a Beta distribution governed by the hyper-parameters (αd, βd).
Eq. (3) states that the hyper-parameters governing the distribution of average potential
outcomes of each treatment across strata come from a common hyper-prior distributon
π.
We assume that the parameters (αd, βd,θd.) are independent across the treatment
arms d. We choose a hyper-prior for the hyper-parameters (αd, βd) with a common
density equal to (α + β)−2.5, up to a multiplicative constant. In doing so, we follow the
recommendation of Gelman et al. (2014, p.110) for picking a “non-informative” hyper-
prior.
Intuitively, updating based on this prior works as follows. For each treatment d,




t across the different strata x. Based on
these success rates, we learn the mean and dispersion of θdx across strata, as reflected
in the hyper-parameters (αd, βd). Then we use these as a prior, which together with the
cumulative successes rdxt observed for a given stratum x allows us to form an updated
belief about θdx for that stratum.
Denote by θ,mt, rt the vectors of parameters, cumulative trials, and cumulative
successes, where each of these is indexed by both d and x, and denote by α,β the
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vectors of hyper-parameters indexed by d. We sample from the posterior distribution of
(θ,α,β) given mt−1, rt−1 using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm described in
Algorithm 1 in Appendix A.2.
3.2 Treatment assignment algorithm
Let pdxt denote the posterior probability that a treatment d is optimal in stratum x, in the
sense that it maximizes the probability of employment. That is, define
pdxt = P
(






Equation (A.1) in the appendix shows how to estimate this probability by an average
across Markov Chain Monte Carlo draws, which we denote p̂dx.
Two popular algorithms for assigning treatments in experiments are (i) fully ran-
dom assignment, with equal probabilities across arms, and (ii) Thompson sampling.
Our experiment is based on a combination of these two algorithms.
Fully randomized sampling assigns treatment d with probability 1/k, where k = 4
is the number of different treatments, to units in every stratum. These assignment prob-
abilities maximize power for tests of non-zero treatment effects. Thompson sampling,
by contrast, assigns treatment d with probability p̂dxt to units in stratum x in time period
t. Thompson sampling minimizes expected regret (cf. Agrawal and Goyal 2012; Bubeck
and Cesa-Bianchi 2012), or equivalently maximizes average outcomes, in the large sam-
ple limit. As shown in these papers, it is in particular the case that expected regret
only grows at a logarithmic rate with the number of experimental units. Russo and
Van Roy (2016) prove worst-case bounds on the performance of Thompson sampling,
using information-theoretic arguments.
Our primary goal is to maximize the labor market outcomes of experimental partic-
ipants, but we also consider the precision of treatment effect estimates to be a secondary
objective. Motivated by this combination of objectives, we assign treatment d to units in
stratum x with probability
(1− γ) · p̂dx + γ/k, (5)
where γ is the share of observations that are randomized between treatment arms with
equal probability. We refer to this procedure as the Tempered Thompson Algorithm.
In our experiment, we measure employment outcomes Yit only with a delay, six
weeks after the intervention took place for each participant. As a consequence, treatment
assignment is conditioned only on the outcomes of participants from six weeks before,
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or earlier. We assign participants in the first six weeks randomly to each treatment arm
with probability 0.25.
3.3 Large sample properties
We now turn to a formal characterization of the large sample properties of our treat-
ment assignment algorithm. We recapitulate and summarize our assumptions for this
characterization in Assumption 1. In the following, we use θ0 to denote the fixed, true
vector of average potential outcomes from which the data are generated. By contrast,
we use θ to denote the corresponding random vector which is drawn from the poste-
rior distribution (belief) of the experimenter. The first step in Theorem 1 below, then, is
based on the result that the posterior converges to the truth, that is, the distribution of
θ concentrates around θ0.




0 is unique for all x ∈ {1, . . . , nx}, and denote ∆dx = maxd θdx0 − θdx0 . Assume
that (Y1it, . . . , Y
k
it, Xit) is i.i.d. across both i and t, and that
Ydit|(Xit = x,θ0) ∼ Ber(θdx0 ).
Assume that Nt ≥ N for all t and some constant N, and that the prior distribution for θ has full
support.
Assume that treatment d is assigned to units in stratum x in period t with probability
(1− γ) · pdxt + γ/k,
where pdxt equals the posterior probability that treatment d is optimal in stratum x, and 0 < γ ≤
1. Denote qdxt the cumulative share of observations assigned to treatment d in stratum x across
the time periods 1, . . . , t, and px the probability that Xit = x.
Theorem 1 (Large sample properties of Tempered Thompson Algorithm ) Under Assump-
tion 1, the following holds true as t (and thus Mt = ∑t′≤t Nt′) goes to ∞:
1. Consistency: The posterior probability pdxt that treatment d is optimal in stratum x con-
verges to 1 in probability (conditional on θ0) for d = d∗x, and to 0 for all other d.16
2. Converging shares: The cumulative share qdxt allocated to treatment d in stratum x con-
verges in probability to q̄dx = (1− γ) + γ/k for d = d∗x, and to q̄dx = γ/k for all other
d.
16 Note that this statement refers to frequentist consistency (given θ0) of a Bayesian posterior probability
(which averages over θ).
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The large sample result of Theorem 1 characterizes the trade-offs in choosing γ.
The parameter γ allows us to interpolate between non-adaptive, conventional random-
ization (γ = 1) and Thompson sampling (γ = 0). The former is optimal for minimizing
the expected variance of treatment effect estimators. The latter is optimal for mini-
mizing the expected regret (maximizing expected welfare) for the participants in the
experiment.
As we increase γ, starting from a value of 0, the expected in-sample regret increases
linearly in proportion to γ. On the other hand, the asymptotic variance of conditional
average treatment effect estimators, comparing the conditionally optimal treatment to






((1− γ) + γ/k) · px +
θdx0 (1− θdx0 )
(γ/k) · px .
This number is decreasing in γ, since higher γ means a more balanced distribution of
observations across treatment arms. In our application, we trade off these conflicting
objectives by setting the share of observations for wich treatment is fully randomized
to γ = 0.2, which implies that the probability of being assigned to each treatment is
bounded below by 0.05.
More generally, the relative weight that researchers should assign to participant
welfare versus estimator precision might depend on a number of contextual factors.
One factor is the size of the experimental population relative to the population that will
be ultimately reached by interventions informed by the trial. The larger this size, the
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greater the weight one might wish to put on estimator precision, and the larger the
optimal γ. Another factor is whether the treated population is particularly vulnerable
and hence requires special protection. If that is the case, ethical considerations suggest
a greater weight for participant welfare, and thus a smaller optimal γ.
3.4 Discussion of Theorem 1 and the Tempered Thompson Algorithm
Several observations are worth making about the properties of the Tempered Thompson
Algorithm and Theorem 1. First, the theorem implies that the large sample properties
of the Tempered Thompson Algorithm do not depend on the prior (as long as the latter
has full support): In large samples the data dominate the prior, the posterior is con-
sistent, and thus assignment shares become independent of the prior. Relative to pure
Thompson sampling, this happens even faster for the Tempered Thompson Algorithm
with γ > 0.
The flip side of this large-sample robustness to the prior is robustness to the data
in the initial periods, for three distinct reasons. First, Bayesian inference optimally com-
bines data and prior, and therefore down-weights outliers among the initial observa-
tions. This stabilizes assignment shares in initial periods, and makes them closer to
an equal division among treatment arms. Only when evidence has accumulated that
some treatment arms are better than others do assignment shares become unequal. Sec-
ond, relative to Thompson sampling the Tempered Thompson Algorithm additionally
shrinks assignment shares toward the balanced assignment. And third, the outcomes in
our setting are bounded, and therefore the influence of any single observation on the
posterior is necessarily bounded, as well.
The properties of the Tempered Thompson Algorithm listed in Theorem 1 rely on
having sufficient power (enough observations) to be able to distinguish the best treat-
ment with high probability. It therefore presupposes that learning is sufficiently fast.
An alternative characterization might consider the worst case behavior of the Tempered
Thompson Algorithm across possible values for the parameter vector θ0, for a given
T. As it turns out, the worst case behavior in terms of in-sample regret is driven by
intermediate parameter values which are such that the treatment effects ∆dx (relative to
the optimal treatment) are of the same order of magnitude as the standard errors for
estimates of these treatment effects, that is, of order 1/
√
T (Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi,
2012; Russo and Van Roy, 2016). If treatment effects are larger, the best treatment is dis-
covered quickly and in-sample regret is low. If treatment effects are smaller, it doesn’t
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matter as much which treatment participants are assigned.17
3.5 Inference
One worry about adaptive experimental designs is that they lead to biased inference (see
for instance Hadad et al. 2019). Item 4 of Theorem 1 implies, however, that this is not
the case for the Tempered Thompson Algorithm in large samples. Sample averages in
each treatment arm are consistent, asymptotically unbiased, and normally distributed,
so that inference can proceed as if treatment assignment was not adaptive. This is true
because assignment probabilities for each arm in each stratum are bounded away from
0 when γ > 0. In our empirical analysis, we nevertheless consider two methods for
inference that do not rely on such asymptotics, but instead are exactly valid in finite
samples despite adaptive assignment, as detailed next.
Our first form of inference is Bayesian, based on the hierarchical default prior de-
scribed in Section 3.1 above. To construct credible sets (i.e., sets that have a given poste-
rior probability of containing the true parameters), we report 0.025 and 0.975 quantiles,
based on Markov Chain Monte Carlo draws. We do so for all our estimates listed in the
previous section. This yields sets that have a posterior probability of 95% to contain the
true parameters, conditional on the data of the experiment.
We would like to emphasize that standard Bayesian inference remains valid in
finite samples for adaptive designs such as ours, since the likelihood function is not
affected by adaptivity. In large samples, as long as γ > 0, our credible sets also have
95% frequentist coverage probability, i.e., they are confidence sets in the usual sense; cf.
van der Vaart (2000), chapter 10. This holds because the share of observations assigned
to each treatment in each stratum is bounded below, asymptotically.
Additionally, we provide randomization-based p-values that are valid under the
sharp null hypothesis that there are no treatment effects, i.e., under the null that Ydit =
Yd
′
it for all d, d
′, i, t. Under this null, we can generate counterfactual data by re-running
our assignment algorithm repeatedly, leaving outcomes as they are in our data, but
generating new treatment assignments. The distribution of test-statistics over this re-
randomization distribution can be used to construct critical values and p-values that are
exact in finite samples, under the sharp null.




In this section, we discuss the impact of the interventions and the performance of the
Tempered Thompson Algorithm. We first present a set of results on wage employment
based on the rapid follow-up survey carried out six weeks after baseline. We do this in
two different ways. First, we present Bayesian posteriors and credible sets. Second, we
report the difference between weighted average employment in each treatment group
and in the control group.18 Here, we use randomization inference to construct a p-value
of the sharp null of no treatment effect.19 We also present three ‘welfare contrasts’ that
quantify the overall impact of our interventions, as detailed in Section 4.1.3 below.
We then present a broader set of results from the longer surveys we carried out
two months and four months after baseline. These surveys capture wage employment,
but also measure job-search, earnings, well-being, social integration and migration in-
tentions. For each outcome, we report weighted averages and randomization inference
p-values as explained above.
4.1 Employment in the rapid follow-up survey and performance of the Tem-
pered Thompson Algorithm
4.1.1 Employment in the rapid follow-up survey
Job-finding rates in the control group are consistently low, especially for Syrians. Six
weeks after joining the program, the average control wage-employment rate is 4.9 per-
cent (Table 2). Further, individuals sampled at different points in time tend to have
similar six-week employment rates, except for somewhat higher rates for those sampled
in the first month of the experiment. We show this in Figure 1 where we plot the em-
ployment rate against the week of sampling. These averages, however, mask substantial
18 Weighting is necessary as the samples in each experimental group are mechanically unbalanced due to










1(Dit = d, Xit = x)
∑it 1(Xit = x)
.
Wit is some outcome of interest of individual i sampled on day t, Dit is the treatment status of this
individual, Xit is the stratum, and N is the total number of experimental participants. So adx is the
overall proportion of individuals in stratum x assigned to treatment d by the end of the experiment.
19 We only compute randomization inference p-values for individuals that were contacted during the rapid
follow-up survey. For consistency, we thus drop observations that have attrited in the rapid follow-up
survey, but not in the two and four month follow-up surveys (39 and 24 observations, respectively).
24
Table 2: Impacts on employment in the rapid follow-up survey
All Syrians Jordanians
Cash 0.006 (0.296) 0.013 (0.123) -0.001 (0.531)
Information -0.005 (0.690) -0.004 (0.626) -0.006 (0.648)
Nudge 0.003 (0.388) 0.005 (0.348) 0.002 (0.463)
Control mean 0.049 0.027 0.068
Observations 3668 1633 2035
Note: The table reports impacts on wage employment at the time of the rapid follow-up interview (6 weeks
after treatment). Next to each treatment effect estimate, we report a randomization inference p-value,
obtained using the procedure discussed in Section 3.5. The first panel reports results for the whole sample.
The second panel reports results for Syrians. The third panel reports results for Jordanians.
Figure 1: Employment rate by week of sampling
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heterogeneity (Table A.9 in the Online Appendix). Employment rates among Jordani-
ans (6.8 percent) are more than twice as large as employment rates among Syrians (2.7
percent). Similarly, the male employment rate (7.7 percent) is more than twice as large
as the female employment rate (3.1 percent). Overall, most subgroups have employ-
ment rates below 10 percent.20 Given that job search at baseline was substantial, this
highlights the difficulty of finding work in this labour market.
Our main finding is that, six weeks after the start of the program, none of the inter-
ventions increase employment for the average program participant. We report Bayesian
20 In Table A.8 in the Online Appendix, we look at the full break-down in sixteen strata, we find that three
strata have employment rates above 10 percent. However, in two of these case, the strata have very few
observations and so our measure of employment rate is likely to be noisy.
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posteriors on the impacts of the different treatments and the respective credible sets in
Figure A.7 in the Appendix. These posteriors indicate that the impact on employment is
always smaller than 1 percentage point. We confirm this result by reporting differences
in weighted employment rates in Table 2.
We are unable to find evidence of treatment impacts for specific, pre-specified
groups of individuals. In Figure A.7, for example, we show treatment effects after
splitting the sample by nationality and do not find evidence of impacts on employment
on either Syrians or Jordanians. Posteriors are somewhat larger for Syrians than for
Jordanians, but the credible sets always overlap. We report credible sets for all sixteen
strata in Table A.1 in the Online Appendix. Further, Table 2 and A.9 report differences
in weighted employment by group which confirm these findings. Employment effects
are somewhat larger for Syrians (e.g. employment rates in the cash group are a 1.3
percentage point higher than in the control group), but these effects are not significantly
different from zero.
4.1.2 Performance of the Tempered Thompson Algorithm
Consistently with the results presented above, we find that in the last week of the study
our algorithm places similar proportions of people in each of the four experimental
groups. We show the probability of assignment to the four experimental conditions for
each week of the study in Figure 2. By design, individuals are assigned to the different
groups in equal proportion up to the sixth week of the study, as we have no information
to update the priors up to that point. When learning started, the algorithm initially
assigned more weight to the nudge intervention. However, this was slowly reversed
after the 20th week of the study.
The algorithm’s departure from equal-proportions randomisation is somewhat more
pronounced for specific strata. We show this in Figure A.1 in the Appendix, where we
show strata-specific weekly treatment assignment probabilities, and in Table A.10 in the
Online Appendix, where we show, for each treatment, the posterior probability that
employment rates are highest under that treatment – that is, the posteriors that deter-
mine treatment assignment probabilities in our algorithm. While for some strata the
assignment probabilities never depart from 25% in a sustained way, in some strata we
do observe clear changes. For example, in the last week of the experiment, we assign
almost 60% of inexperienced and less educated Jordanian women to the cash interven-
tion. Similarly, for some strata, the probability that the control is optimal drops to a few
percentage points (e.g. inexperienced, less educated female Syrians). However, it should
be stressed that, as discussed above, the differences in potential outcomes we estimate
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Figure 2: Assignment probabilities by week
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are small and hence the impacts of departing from equal-proportions randomizaton are
limited in this context.
4.1.3 Welfare contrasts
We present three ‘welfare contrasts’ that quantify the overall impact of our interventions,
both against a counterfactual where no treatment is given, and against a counterfactual
where treatments are randomized in equal proportion. First, within the experiment, we
compare the average potential outcomes for the actually chosen treatment assignment to
the average that would have obtained under random assignment,














This measures how much better we did for our experimental participants, compared to
a conventional design with fully random assignment.
Second, we compare the optimal targeted policy, and the optimal non-targeted policy,
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Table 3: Welfare contrasts
Estimate 95% Credible set
∆1 0.002 (0.000, 0.004)
∆2 0.017 (0.001, 0.034)
∆3 0.006 (-0.015, 0.027)
Note: The table reports the welfare contrasts defined in Section 4.1.3.





























The definition of ∆2 allows the optimized d to depend on x, while the definition of ∆3
requires the same d to be implemented for all x.
We estimate that overall impacts on employment after six weeks are small; Table
3 reports our corresponding estimates of the three welfare contrasts specified above.
We have two key findings. First, if we compare the optimal targeted policy to a coun-
terfactual where no intervention is given (welfare contrast ∆2), we estimate a gain in
employment of 1.7 percentage points (95% credible set: [0.001, 0.034]). Relative to the
employment rate in the control groups, this amounts to a 35% increase in employment.
The optimal non-targeted policy, on the other hand, delivers a gain in employment of
about half of a percentage point (welfare contrast ∆3), with a credible sets that includes
zero (95% credible set: [-0.015, 0.27]). The difference in employment gains between these
measures suggests that there may be some modest gains from targeting. Overall, the
percentage point effects are on the lower end of the impacts of ALMPs on employment
reported in McKenzie (2017) (which are typically measured over a longer time frame).
In our study, adaptive randomization did not generate any six-weeks employment
gains over standard randomization. We show this by reporting welfare contrast ∆1, in
Table 3, which is very close to zero.
4.2 Estimated impacts in the ESO follow-up surveys
We now turn to explore effects at the two-month and four-month follow-up points,
using detailed data from the follow-up surveys conducted by the Employment Service
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Officers (ESOs).
4.2.1 Impacts on job search
Despite the null impacts on employment after six weeks, we document that all interven-
tions generate marked increases in job search among Syrians.21 As shown in Table 4,
the cash transfer raises the proportion of Syrians who look for work two months after
baseline by 5.6 percentage points (a 13 percent increase over a control job-search rate of
44 percent) and leads Syrians to place 0.5 more job applications (a 40 percent increase
over a control mean of 1.2 applications). Similarly, the information intervention and
the nudge intervention raise job search rates by 4.7 percentage points and 3.7 percent-
age points respectively. Both of these interventions also have significant impacts on job
applications: a 35 percent increase for the information intervention and a 55 percent
increase for the nudge intervention.
Among Jordanians, the cash and information interventions have smaller and in-
significant impacts on job search (Table 4). For example, the cash intervention is associ-
ated with a 3.3 percentage point insignificant increase in the job-search rate. However,
we find a large and positive impact of the nudge intervention on job search (6.5 percent-
age points). Importantly, no intervention is associated with a significant impact on job
applications among Jordanians and, for both the cash and information intervention, the
effect is actually negative. Finally, Table 4 also highlights that Jordanians search much
more intensely than Syrian refugees in the absence of the interventions: the control job
search rate is 30 percent higher and the control number of job applications is twice as
large.
4.2.2 Impacts on labour market outcomes
We find that both the cash and information intervention improve Syrian refugees’ labour
market outcomes at the two-month and four-month marks.22 We report the relevant co-
efficient estimates and randomisation inference p-values in Table 5 and Table 6. Offering
cash leads to a significant increase in the employment rate of more than 50 percent (an
effect of 5.2 percentage points in the two-month survey and 3.8 percentage points at the
21 The analysis of job search outcomes in this sub-section was not pre-specified. In the Pre-Analysis Plan
we committed to studying the impacts of the interventions on five main longer-term outcomes (which
we report in the next subsection). Further, we anticipated that, motivated by our main results on those
outcomes, we would run a number of additional exploratory regressions to better understand treatment
mechanisms. This subsection presents this exploratory analysis.
22 The analysis in this sub-section was pre-specified. We summarise all variable definitions in Table A.11.
We report results disaggregated by nationality in Table 5 and 6. We report results for the full sample in
Table A.13 and Table A.14 in the Online Appendix.
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Table 4: Job search impacts after 2 months
Searched for work Applications Hours job search
Syrians
Cash 0.056 (0.077) 0.518 (0.043) 0.794 (0.133)
Information 0.047 (0.123) 0.423 (0.072) 0.056 (0.482)
Nudge 0.037 (0.195) 0.648 (0.016) 0.698 (0.157)
Control mean 0.437 1.19 4.162
Observations 1536 1440 1444
Jordanians
Cash 0.033 (0.165) -0.055 (0.553) -0.672 (0.831)
Information 0.025 (0.255) -0.501 (0.874) -0.457 (0.757)
Nudge 0.065 (0.030) 0.458 (0.130) 0.241 (0.350)
Control mean 0.577 2.71 5.792
Observations 1897 1783 1717
Note: This table reports treatment effects on the three variables measuring job search, 2 months after the
baseline interview. ‘Job search’ is a dummy for whether the person has done any job search in the last 30
days. ‘Applications’ is the number of job applications completed in the last 30 days. ‘Hours search’ is the
number of hours of job search in the last seven days. ‘Applications’ and ‘Hours search’ are windsorised at
the 99th percentile of the nationality-specific distribution. The first panel reports impacts for Syrians, and
the second panel reports impacts for Jordanians. Next to each treatment effect, we report a randomization
inference p-value.
four-month survey) and a significant boost in earnings of about 40 percent after two
months and of 65 percent after four months.23
We estimate that the information intervention increased employment and earnings
by almost the same amount as the cash grant two months after baseline; four months
after baseline, this intervention generates a 40 percent increase in employment (i.e.,
1.9 percentage points, marginally insignificant) and a 55 percent increase in earnings
(again, marginally insignificant). We also find that the nudge intervention has weaker
and short-lived effects on the labour market outcomes of refugees. Four months after
baseline, we are unable to document any significant impacts of this intervention.
Note that we find different results – in both control group employment rate and
in treatment effects – when we compare the six-week rapid follow-up surveys with
23 We compute a set of sharpened q-values to control for the fact that we test for impacts on each outcome
three times – once per intervention. The q-values for the impacts of the cash intervention on employ-
ment after 2 and 4 months are, respectively, 0.051 and 0.081. The q-values for the impacts of the cash
intervention on earnings after 2 and 4 months are, respectively, 0.12 and 0.138.
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the two-month ESO follow-up surveys. We attribute this discrepancy to a difference
in the interpretation of the employment question in the two surveys. In particular,
due both to ethical and confidentiality concerns, we did not ask respondents to specify
whether a particular wage job was formal or not. Further, as discussed in section 2.6,
ESO surveys were conducted by staff members familiar to the respondents, whereas
the rapid-response surveys were conducted by someone whom the respondents had not
previously met. It is thus likely that many respondents, and particularly Syrian refugees,
had more trust in the ESO enumerators, and hence were more likely to discuss informal
work with them. In support of this interpretation, we show in Table A.12 in the Online
Appendix that a substantial share of the increase in wage employment documented in
the two-month follow-up survey occurs in jobs that pay just below the formal monthly
minimum wage: a useful proxy of informality. In section 4.4, we show that these jobs
have high hourly earnings, but fewer hours worked per month than formal jobs (and
so, overall, lower monthly pay). During our qualitative interviews (section 4.4.3), many
respondents expressed a preference for this type of work.
The magnitude of the effects on refugee employment and earnings that we docu-
ment is large relative to the estimates reported in the recent literature for other active
labor market policies in developing countries (McKenzie, 2017). In proportional terms,
both the earning and the employment effects are at the top of the distribution of the
estimates reported in the literature. While this is partly driven by the low control em-
ployment rate, in absolute terms, the employment effect is still close to the top of the
distribution of existing estimates for job search assistance policies (but smaller than the
impacts of the most effective wage subsidy and training interventions). If the four-
month impacts were sustained for about one year, the increase in earnings would equal
the size of the cash grant. In comparison to the existing literature, however, our results
speak only to a relatively short impact duration (namely, two-months and four-months
after treatment); as explained earlier, the Covid lockdown forced the cancellation of our
planned six-month follow-up survey (and, of course, caused massive disruption to the
Jordanian labour market more generally).
For refugees, the cash grant and information interventions are also associated with
small, insignificant increases in the well-being index and with an insignificant 7 percent
drop in the proportion of people that intend to migrate outside of Jordan. While the
migration effect is not significant, in absolute terms, the 4 percentage points decrease
we estimate is commensurate to the size of the positive employment effects of these
interventions. Finally, we do not find any impacts on social integration, consistent with
recent evidence suggesting that baseline social integration for Syrian refugees in Jordan
is high relative to the experience of Syrian refugees in European countries or in the US
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(Alrababa’h et al., 2019).
For Jordanians, on the other hand, we are unable to find evidence of labour market
impacts for any intervention (Table 5 and Table 6). This is particularly surprising for
the nudge intervention, which has positive impacts on job search for this population.
Further, for the cash intervention, we document an (insignificant) 2.9 percentage point
reduction in employment and an (insignificant) 25 percent reduction earnings after four
months, but a contemporaneous, significant increase in the well-being index of 0.06
of a standard deviation. This may be consistent with the cash intervention enabling
jobseekers to reject offers for undesirable jobs.
4.3 The impact of Tempered Thompson had we targeted two-month employ-
ment
As noted, we operationalised our Tempered Thompson algorithm using our rapid follow-
up surveys – where we found no impact of any treatment. What if, instead of us-
ing employment at the six-month rapid follow-up survey, we had instead targeted the
two-month employment rate – where we found large impacts of cash, information and
nudge treatments? To answer this question, we run a counter-factual simulation exer-
cise. Specifically, we mimic the arrival rate of respondents (and their strata), but simu-
late employment outcomes using the observed two-month treatment effects (measured
at the stratum level); we then simulate alternative treatment assignments based on those
simulated employment outcomes.
Figure 3 shows the main result from this exercise: it plots the average simulated
share assigned, over time, to the best treatment (where ‘best treatment’ is allowed here
to vary with the strata).24 The figure confirms that the Tempered Thompson algorithm
is quite capable of generating substantial learning in this kind of context, with the kinds
of effect sizes that one might observe: indeed, the figure confirms that the limited per-
formance of the algorithm in our experiment is attributable to our decision to target the
six-week ‘rapid follow-up’ data, rather than the two-month ESO data.
In Appendix Figure A.14, we show the simulated expected employment rates by
week. We estimate that the rate of employment in the control group would have been
11.2%, the rate of employment among respondents in a ‘pure RCT’ (with equal weight
on each treatment) would be 12.4%, and the rate of employment from the Tempered
Thompson algorithm would be 13.4%. That is, had we used the two-month data from
the ESO surveys, rather than the six-week rapid follow-up data, Tempered Thompson
24 The volatility in this figure – and in Appendix Figure A.14 – is driven by day-to-day changes in the
proportions of different strata; this is reflected in the figures because our simulation replicated the exact
arrival patterns of strata in our experiment.
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Table 5: Treatment effects on main outcomes after 2 months
Employed Earnings Well-being Social integration Intends to migrate
Syrians
Cash 0.052 (0.017) 7.204 (0.062) 0.021 (0.333) -0.009 (0.575) -0.038 (0.838)
Information 0.047 (0.036) 6.209 (0.092) 0.025 (0.309) -0.035 (0.728) -0.041 (0.856)
Nudge 0.035 (0.081) 4.210 (0.185) 0.007 (0.445) -0.055 (0.817) -0.031 (0.783)
Control mean 0.091 16.268 0.088 0.011 0.664
Observations 1608 1605 1608 1608 1598
Jordanians
Cash -0.007 (0.618) -1.491 (0.618) 0.101 (0.012)
Information -0.006 (0.624) -2.486 (0.696) 0.019 (0.342)
Nudge -0.004 (0.585) -1.684 (0.631) 0.015 (0.385)
Control mean 0.128 29.22 0.069
Observations 1985 1977 1985
Table 6: Treatment effects on main outcomes after 4 months
Employed Earnings Well-being Social integration Intends to migrate
Syrians
Cash 0.038 (0.027) 6.550 (0.040) 0.043 (0.163) 0.005 (0.472) -0.044 (0.875)
Information 0.019 (0.148) 4.567 (0.105) 0.003 (0.480) 0.001 (0.470) -0.046 (0.884)
Nudge 0.003 (0.449) 0.260 (0.484) 0.052 (0.106) 0.005 (0.467) -0.034 (0.810)
Control mean 0.052 9.76 0.008 -0.005 0.675
Observations 1565 1563 1565 1565 1561
Jordanians
Cash -0.025 (0.855) -7.515 (0.911) 0.068 (0.055)
Information -0.009 (0.658) -4.299 (0.773) 0.041 (0.169)
Nudge -0.002 (0.544) -2.845 (0.709) 0.040 (0.176)
Control mean 0.144 33.451 0.039
Observations 1913 1900 1913
Note: These tables report treatment effects on the five main outcomes specified in the Pre-Analysis Plan,
2 and 4 months after the baseline interview. ‘Employed’ is a dummy for whether the person has a wage-
paying job at the time of the interview. ‘Earnings’ is the value earnings from the main job (where individ-
uals who are not in wage employment are assigned a zero). ‘Well-being’ is a weighted index that includes:
(i) a measure of expenditure, (ii) a measure of positive affect, and (iii) a measure of life satisfaction. ‘Social
integration’ is an index of social integration. ‘Intends to migrate’ is a dummy for whether the respondent
intends to migrate to a third country (i.e. this measure does not include return migration). The first panel
reports impacts for Syrians, and the second panel reports impacts for Jordanians. Next to each treatment
effect estimate, we report a randomization inference p-value.
would have generated approximately double the employment gains of a standard ex-
periment.25
Figure 3: Simulated probability of being assigned to the best treatment
4.4 What prevents effective job search among refugees?
4.4.1 Quantitate evidence on liquidity constraints
What have we learned about barriers to job search among refugees? Our ESO follow-up
surveys at the two-month and four-month marks show that the cash intervention has
the largest impacts on job search and employment for this population. Here, we present
evidence suggesting that the cash grant is effective because liquidity constraints are a
key labour market barrier for refugees.26 We do this by studying whether proxies for
available liquidity are associated with higher control job search intensity and whether
treatment effects are heterogeneous with respect to liquidity. Further, we report im-
pacts on additional measures of job quality. Liquidity-constrained individuals would
forgo desirable employment opportunities due to the inability to pay for search and
25 Appendix Figure A.15 shows the simulated gains by strata; the effect is particularly driven by Syrians
with employment experience (both men and women, with and without high-school education), and by
Jordanian men with high-school education and work experience.
26 The analysis in this section was not pre-registered, but is part of our exploration of treatment mecha-
nisms.
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application costs; if these constraints are binding, the marginal jobs obtained by cash
beneficiaries would have similar or better quality as the control jobs.
First, among control refugees, we find a strong association between job-search in-
tensity and expenditure at baseline (a proxy of liquidity). We plot this relationship non-
parametrically in Figure A.9 in the Online Appendix; both the probability of searching
for work and the number of job applications increase with expenditure, especially for in-
dividuals with expenditure below the median. These associations are sizeable. Using a
linear regression, we find that a one standard deviation increase in expenditure at base-
line is associated with a 0.6 standard deviation increase in the number of job applications
sent (and a 0.08 standard deviation increase in the probability of job search). In contrast,
among Jordanians, this relationship is much weaker: an increase in expenditure by one
standard deviation is associated with a 0.3 standard deviation increase in the number of
job applications and a 0.03 standard deviation increase in the probability of job search
(also see Figure A.10). This is consistent with several recent quantitative reports from in-
ternational organisations working with refugees, which report that cash-constraints are
a first-order concern both for Syrian refugees in Jordan (Abu Hamad et al., 2017), and
for Syrian refugees in Lebanon (Lehmann and Masterson, 2014; Chaaban et al., 2020);
see Schuettler and Caron (2020) for a review. It is also consistent with our qualitative
interviews – described shortly – in which we found that financial constraints are a key
barrier, and that the cash grant was seen as facilitating job search.27
Second, we show that the impacts of the cash intervention are driven by refugees
who have expenditure below the median. We show this in Figures A.11, A.12 and A.13:
impacts on job search and employment are concentrated among the poorest respondents
(while impacts on job applications are more evenly distributed). In contrast, the infor-
mation and nudge intervention have (i) generally weaker impacts on job search among
low-expenditure refugees, and (ii) employment impacts for low expenditure refugees
that are about half of those of the cash intervention. Additional evidence in support of
credit constraints comes from refugees’ reports on how they spent the cash: 26 percent
of recipients in the low-expenditure group report that they mostly spend the money on
job search. Among above-median expenditure recipients, this proportion drops to 18
percent.28
Third, we find that the cash intervention boosts job retention and, after four months,
27 Hagen-Zanker et al. (2018) also report on qualitative interviews with Syrian refugees in Jordan, and also
emphasize the primary importance of financial constraints.
28 Among Jordanians, 32 percent of respondents report to have spent the cash mostly on job search. How-
ever, this proportion does not vary by baseline expenditure. Given the null impacts on job search and
the higher control job-search intensity, it is likely that cash given to Jordanians has mostly financed
infra-marginal job search.
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hourly wages; we show this in Table 7. The grant doubles the probability of having re-
tained a job between the two- and the four-month interviews – from 3.3 percent to 6.2
percent. Further, mean hourly wages among employed cash beneficiaries are .63 of a
standard deviation higher than in the control group. The other two interventions, on the
other hand, are associated with much smaller increases in retention and hourly wages
(for example, job retention among information recipients is 5.2 percent, and the impact
on hourly wages is about .04 of a standard deviation). These impacts indicate that,
consistently with the prediction of a model where job search is constrained by limited
liquidity, the cash intervention enables jobseekers to find jobs that have higher match
quality – and hence are more stable and better paid.
Table 7: Retention and wages for Syrians
Job retention month 4 Hourly wage month 2 Hourly wage month 4
Cash 0.030 (0.036) 0.037 (0.393) 0.308 (0.055)
Information 0.017 (0.139) -0.131 (0.835) -0.087 (0.673)
Nudge 0.011 (0.270) -0.124 (0.812) -0.010 (0.527)
Control mean 0.034 1.377 1.197
Observations 1565 193 94
Note: This table reports treatment effects on the three additional outcomes. ‘Job retention month 4? is a
dummy capturing whether, at the time of the 4 month follow-up, the respondent holds the same job they
held at the time of the 2 month follow-up. ‘Hourly wage’ is a variable obtained by diving monthly wage
earnings by hours worked. Next to each treatment effect estimate, we report a randomization inference
p-value.
4.4.2 Eliciting expert forecasts
At the time of launching our interventions, we conducted an incentivized elicitation
exercise with IRC staff. We ran this online, surveying 16 staff based in Amman, and four
senior staff based in New York. For all respondents, we began by providing descriptive
quantitative information on the background of our sample, a brief description of each
intervention, and information on the employment rate for a similar sample in 2018
(namely, a rate of 2.5%). We then asked a series of questions about each respondent’s
prediction for the rate of employment after six weeks; this was directly incentivized.29
We illustrate forecast employment rates in the Online Appendix (Figures A.16 and A.17).
29 Specifically, we told respondents that we would randomly draw one of their employment forecasts; if this
forecast was within 1 percentage point of the correct answer, we would provide a lottery ticket having
50 tickets and a prize of US$200.
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We have three main findings. First, relative to our estimated treatment effects, local
staff were very optimistic in their forecasts: at the median, they predicted employment
rates of 20%, 10% and 9% for the cash, information and nudge interventions respectively
(the median forecast for the control group was 2.25%). Senior staff had more accurate
forecasts: medians of 7%, 5% and 4% (against a median prediction in the control group
of 3%). Second, the dispersion in forecasts was very large, indicating substantial uncer-
tainty about treatment impacts. Third, interestingly, both local and senior staff correctly
anticipated that the cash intervention would be most effective.
4.4.3 Qualitative fieldwork
Five months after the trial began, we conducted structured qualitative interviews in
the form of focus group discussions with participants who have received one of the
three search interventions. The purpose of the interviews was to build a deeper under-
standing of the job search process and the mechanisms by which some interventions
may have worked for different groups of participants. Participants were divided into
six single-gender groups, each group focusing on one of the three interventions (cash,
informational, or psychological support). We found the following results.
First, consistently with our experimental findings, respondents identified finan-
cial constraints as a key barrier to economic opportunity. The cash grant was by far the
most popular intervention, irrespective of the demographics of the respondents. Among
those who received the grant, some indicated that they used the cash directly to cover
transportation costs when searching for work. Several others, in particular, Syrian fe-
males, reported using the cash to cover immediate basic needs such as medical bills
for themselves or the family. Given participants’ highly vulnerable economic situations,
the cash was seen as necessary step before searching for work. One Syrian female cash
recipient reported that she used the cash for medical care, which allowed her to then
begin searching for work and eventually to find a job in a factory. These qualitative
findings match our quantitative results.
Second, participants reported mixed views on the informational and nudge inter-
ventions. The information intervention was only reported to be useful or accessible by
Jordanians who had higher education levels than the typical participant in our study. At
the same time, for some of those who understood the content, the information interven-
tion was a source of frustration given that employers frequently violated labor laws. As
such, the information on labor laws was not deemed to represent de facto labor rights.
The nudge intervention was reported to be useful by the Syrian women we talked
to, but for reasons quite different from our original theory of change. Rather than work-
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ing as a commitment device, these respondents reported that the intervention motivated
them by making them feel ‘like someone cared about them’, and by making job search
top of mind. One Syrian woman indicated that following the last SMS message, she
continued to use her tool and shared it with her female neighbours. However, others
(mostly Jordanian males) reported a lack of interest or desire to receive SMS reminders
on job search intentions and achievements. For this group of participants, the interven-
tion was perceived not to be useful given they were already searching for work.
Finally, participants in all focus groups stressed that formal jobs are often poorly
paid and offer bad working conditions. Women reported concerns about working in
the formal manufacturing sector, where they would be required to mix with men and
undergo long hours away from their children. In fact, many women indicated a strong
interest in starting home-based businesses like a kitchen, beauty salon, accessory shop,
or nursery which would offer them both a ‘safer’ and more flexible work environment.
Men also perceived formal work in factories to be undesirable, but for different reasons.
They mostly complained about low pay: wages in manufacturing firms are considered
insufficient to support a family. Per diem informal work, mainly in services like plumb-
ing, carpentry, and painting, was seen as more profitable. Additionally, factory work
was seen as being potentially exploitative and men shared stories about wages being
withheld or delayed by employers for arbitrary reasons. These observations suggest
that constraints to labor market participation among both refugees and Jordanians are
by no means restricted to the search frictions we have focused on in this study.
5 Conclusion
Randomized controlled trials have come under criticism from an ethical perspective. For
example, Deaton (2020, p. 21) points out that “It is particularly worrying if the research
addresses questions in economics that appear to have no potential benefit for the sub-
jects.” Relatedly, implementation partners might be reluctant to engage in continued
experimentation if they believe that they already know which intervention works best.
Adaptive experimentation can help mitigate both ethical criticisms of RCTs and the re-
luctance of implementation partners to engage in experimentation, by setting welfare
maximization (or regret minimization) as the main objective of an experiment. Indeed,
any optimal adaptive experimental design has the property that participant welfare can-
not be increased in the long-run by using any other (experimental or non-experimental)
treatment allocation procedure.
In this paper, we have reported the results of an implementation of adaptive tar-
geted treatment allocation in a field experiment. Our Tempered Thompson Algorithm
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strikes a balance between maximizing participant welfare and providing precise esti-
mates of treatment effects. Our implementation context was novel: We looked at the
effects of active labor market policies on Syrian refugees and local job-seekers in Jordan.
Our treatments did not have a significant effect on refugee employment after six weeks,
but the cash grant had a substantial impact on longer-term employment outcomes.
Our results show that adaptive targeted experiments can be straightforwardly de-
ployed in the field and can be used to draw scientific and policy conclusions. Moreover,
our methodology creates many possibilities for further applications. The Tempered
Thompson Algorithm is a powerful tool for any setting in which subjects arrive over
time and their outcomes are observed within a short time-frame. In addition to employ-
ment programs, our methodology may be applied in many other development contexts,
including drug and vaccination programs, agricultural technology adoption programs,
climate change mitigation interventions, and emergency relief programs. Further work
on adaptive experiments can tailor experimental designs to specific applications.
One of the most important considerations in future adaptive experiments will be
defining the objective Yt.30 The choice of the objective can change the performance of
the algorithm affecting short-run and long-run participant outcomes. In our case, the
choice of target outcome, i.e., formal employment six weeks after the intervention, was
mainly driven by the organizational objectives of our implementation partner and their
donors. Our results in Section 4.3 suggest that, had we used a broader definition of em-
ployment, our adaptive algorithm would have quickly found the optimal intervention.
More generally, in our context, as in many others (such as education and health), pol-
icymakers do not only care about short-run outcomes that adaptive treatment policies
might typically target. But adapting treatment allocation based on long-term outcomes
can often make the field experiment too long and costly. Instead of only measuring
and targeting long-term outcomes, the designer might therefore wish to find a set of
short-run proxies, i.e., ‘statistical surrogates’, for long-term welfare (Athey et al., 2019);
an adaptive targeted field experiment would therefore be designed in order to target
these statistical surrogates.
30 The challenge of aligning decisions based on machine learning (e.g., of robots and other artificial intel-
ligence systems) with broader societal interests is by no means unique to adaptive experiments (Taylor
et al., 2016; Russell, 2019).
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Our characterization of the large sample properties of our γ-Thompson algorithm relies
on the following two useful results from the literature. The first is a law of large numbers
for adaptive sequences, which can be found as Lemma 5 in Russo (2016). The second
is a sufficient condition for consistency of Bayesian posteriors, known as Schwartz’s
theorem, which can be found as Theorem 6.16 in Ghosal and Van der Vaart (2017).
Lemma 1 (LLN for adaptive sequences) Let {Yn} be an i.i.d sequence of real-valued random
variables with finite variance and let {Wn} be a sequence of binary random variables. Suppose
each sequence is adapted to the filtration {Hn}, and define Zn = P(Wn = 1|Hn−1). If, condi-










Theorem 2 (Schwartz) If p0 ∈ KL(Π) and for every neighborhood U of p0 there exist tests ϕn
such that Pn0 ϕn → 0 and supp∈Uc P
n(1− ϕn)→ 0, then the posterior distribution Π(·|X, . . . , X)
in the model X, . . . , X|p ∼iid p and p ∼ Π is strongly consistent at p0.
In the statement of this theorem, Π is the prior distribution, KL(Π) is its Kullback-
Leibler support.
A.1.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Let Wit = 1(Dit = d, Xit = x), and
Zit = Et[Wit] =
(
(1− γ) · pdxt + γ/k
)
· px,
where Et denotes the conditional expectation given observations up to wave t− 1, and









We have by construction that Zit ≥ px ·γ/k, and since Nt ≥ N, it follows that ∑i,t′≤t Zit′ →
∞ as t → ∞. Applying Lemma 1 to the first fraction, and a standard law of large num-
bers to the inverse of the second fraction, we get that
Ȳdxt → θdx0
in probability as t→ ∞.
1. Given the assumed uniqueness of d∗x, there exists an ε-neighborhood of θ0 such
that d∗x is constant for all x in this neighborhood. The claim follows if we can show
that the posterior probability of such an ε-neighborhood goes to 1 in probability
as t→ ∞.
Given our assumption that the prior for θ has full support, this condition follows
from Schwartz’s theorem (Theorem 2), if we can show existence of a consistent test
for the hypothesis that θ = θ0 against the alternative that ‖θ− θ0‖ > ε.
In our setting such a test can be constructed by setting
ϕt = 1 (‖Ȳ − θ0‖ > ε/2) .
The required consistency follows by convergence in probability of Ȳ .
2. By construction of our algorithm, treatment d is assigned with probability (1−
γ) · pdxt + γ/k to units in stratum x in period t. It follows from item 1 that this
probability converges to q̄dx as t→ ∞.







where p̄xt is the share of observations in stratum x up to period t. The claim follows
from item 2, and the law of large numbers for p̄xt , once we note that ∆
dx = 0 for
d = d∗x.
4. This is an immediate consequence of Corollary 2.1 and Theorem 3.2 in Melfi and
Page (2000), where the necessary conditions of their Theorem 3.2 are verified by
our item 2.
A.3
A.2 Markov Chain Monte Carlo
Algorithm 1 Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the hierarchical Bayes model
Require: The cumulated assignment frequencies mdx and success numbers rdx.
Starting values α0,β0, length of the burn in period B, and number of draws R.
1: for ρ = 1 to B + R do
2: Gibbs step:
Given αρ−1 and βρ−1, for all d, x
draw θdx from the Beta(αdρ + rdx, βdρ + mdx − rdx) distribution.
3: Metropolis step 1:
Given βρ−1 and θρ, draw αdρ
by sampling from a normal proposal distribution (truncated below).
Accept this draw if an independent uniform draw is less than the ratio of the
posterior for the new draw, relative to the posterior for αdρ−1.
Otherwise set αdρ = αdρ−1.
4: Metropolis step 2:
Similarly for βρ−1 given θρ and αρ−1.
5: end for
6: Throw away all draws from the burn-in period ρ = 1, . . . , B.














Denote by θ,mt, rt the vectors of parameters, cumulative trials, and cumulative
successes, where each of these is indexed by both d and x, and denote by α,β the vec-
tors of hyperparameters indexed by d. Let ρ index replication draws, with ρ ranging
from 1 to B + R. We sample from the posterior distribution of (θ,α,β) given mt−1, rt−1
using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm described in Algorithm 1. Markov
Chain Monte Carlo methods are reviewed in Gelman et al. (2014), chapter 11.
Algorithm 1 converges to a stationary distribution that equals the joint posterior of
α, β and θ given mt, rt. In particular, we have that the posterior probability that a treat-


























In our implementation of this algorithm, we use a warm-up period of B = 1, 000,
and then draw R = 10, 000 replications; averaging over these gives our estimated poste-
rior distribution. These values are generously chosen relative to standard recommenda-
tions (cf. Gelman et al. (2014) chapter 11), making convergence likely. In our simulations
these values yield stable posterior probabilities.
A.5
A.3 Additional Table and Figures
Table A.1: 95% credible sets for average potential outcomes
stratum Cash Information Nudge Control
Syr, M, < HS, never emp (0.010, 0.110) (0.000, 0.080) (0.010, 0.090) (0.010, 0.100)
Syr, M, < HS, ever emp (0.030, 0.120) (0.010, 0.090) (0.030, 0.100) (0.030, 0.100)
Syr, M, >= HS, never emp (0.020, 0.260) (0.000, 0.170) (0.010, 0.140) (0.020, 0.240)
Syr, M, >= HS, ever emp (0.010, 0.170) (0.000, 0.170) (0.020, 0.150) (0.010, 0.180)
Syr, F, < HS, never emp (0.010, 0.050) (0.010, 0.060) (0.000, 0.050) (0.000, 0.030)
Syr, F, < HS, ever emp (0.010, 0.080) (0.010, 0.110) (0.020, 0.080) (0.010, 0.070)
Syr, F, >= HS, never emp (0.020, 0.190) (0.000, 0.150) (0.020, 0.150) (0.000, 0.140)
Syr, F, >= HS, ever emp (0.010, 0.180) (0.000, 0.160) (0.010, 0.130) (0.000, 0.160)
Jor, M, < HS, never emp (0.010, 0.110) (0.010, 0.090) (0.020, 0.120) (0.030, 0.120)
Jor, M, < HS, ever emp (0.030, 0.170) (0.040, 0.150) (0.050, 0.140) (0.060, 0.160)
Jor, M, >= HS, never emp (0.040, 0.230) (0.040, 0.220) (0.020, 0.150) (0.000, 0.140)
Jor, M, >= HS, ever emp (0.030, 0.150) (0.020, 0.160) (0.010, 0.110) (0.040, 0.150)
Jor, F, < HS, never emp (0.010, 0.070) (0.020, 0.080) (0.030, 0.090) (0.010, 0.080)
Jor, F, < HS, ever emp (0.060, 0.190) (0.050, 0.170) (0.020, 0.100) (0.030, 0.130)
Jor, F, >= HS, never emp (0.030, 0.150) (0.010, 0.100) (0.010, 0.080) (0.020, 0.130)
Jor, F, >= HS, ever emp (0.000, 0.110) (0.000, 0.100) (0.060, 0.180) (0.020, 0.110)
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